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Abstract—Malware writers frequently try to hide the activities
of their agents within tunnelled traffic. Within the Kill Chain
model the infection time is often measured in seconds, and if
the infection is not detected and blocked, the malware agent,
such as a bot, will often then set up a secret channel to
communicate with its controller. In the case of ransomware the
communicated payload may include the encryption key used
for the infected host to register its infection. As a malware
infection can spread across a network in seconds, it is often
important to detect its activities on the air, in memory and at-rest.
Malware increasingly uses encrypted channels for communicating
with their controllers. This paper presents a new approach to
discovering the cryptographic artefacts of real malware clients
that use cryptographic libraries of the Microsoft Windows
operating system. This enables malware secret communications
to be discovered without any prior malware knowledge.
Index Terms—network traffic; decryption; memory analysis;
Transport Layer Security; bot; ransomware
I. INTRODUCTION
Malicious actors employ secure channels to hide com-
munications from detection agents. These channels enable
activities such as the installation of exploit kits, distribution of
malware and adware, and communicating useful information
to controllers. So, knowledge of channel contents is unknown
while malicious use of secure channel surges - a cloud vendor
blocked 1.7 billion threats using TLS in he second half of 2018
[1]. Malware classes that frequently uses TLS secure channel
for communications are bots and ransomware.
The ransomware element of an attack can be defined as
the weaponisation part, where a ransomware element can be
packaged with a defined distribution and infection methods,
and then targeted as required. The first phase of ransomware,
such as WannaCry, was often fairly scattergun in its targets,
but the usage of ransomware in targeted attacks increases. In
2019, Symantec found that enterprise-targeting ransomware
showed a yearly increase of 12% and attacks on mobile devices
rose by 33% [2]. With WannaCry we saw the weaponisation
of ransomware, which used the Eternal Blue vulnerability for
its infection. The NHS in the UK was but one organization
of many who suffered major outages from the ransomware
infection [3].
Modern bot malware is generally multi-purpose. Once in-
stalled on a client, an external controller determines bot ac-
tivities through issued commands. Encrypted controller-to-bot
channels prevent defenders from discovering commands. Ran-
somware clients are generally single purpose in that users pay
to recover document or device access. Crypto-ransomware,
where documents on an infected client are encrypted and a
payment is required, typically in Bitcoins, for the decryp-
tion key, is a common variant [4]. Communications between
crypto-ransomware clients and controllers may include useful
information such as encryption keys.
Current methods of dealing with malicious use of secure
channels have limitations. Whereas in unencrypted channels,
payload inspection provides knowledge of malware activity,
with encrypted channels, detection methods rely on discover-
ing anomalies between benign and malicious activity. These
methods assist in the detection and possible prevention of pos-
sible malicious activity but cannot provide detailed knowledge
of the malicious activity.
This paper investigates decrypting TLS communications of
real-world malware. A framework uses a standard approach
for decrypting TLS traffic to analyse and decrypt the secure
communications. For malware, performance challenges can
result from malware use of different cryptographic libraries.
So, the framework is extended to accommodate the Windows
cryptographic library. Experiments evaluate decrypting real
bot and ransomware command and control communications
using the extension. The contribution is a novel method to
discovering cryptographic artefacts used by real malware. As
these are discovered in single memory extracts and decrypted
in less than a second, the communicated activities of unknown
malware can be discovered.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Related re-
search on malware command and control channels is presented
in Section II. Section III discusses sourcing of real-world
malware samples while Section IV evaluates and discusses
the limitations of decrypting using a standard TLS decryption
methodology. An new approach for decrypting traffic using
Windows cryptographic libraries is presented in Section V.
The results are presented and discussed in Section VI and
conclusions drawn in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A number of papers focus on memory inspection to discover
the malware threat using calls to APIs. Gupta et al [5] analysed
API calls within Windows and mapped a total of 534 important
API calls with 26 categories (A-Z). These were then used
to identify five types of malware (Worm, Trojan-Downloader,
Trojan-Spy, Trojan-Dropper and Backdoor). Hampton et al [6]
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furthered this work by analysing 14 strains of ransomware
on Windows platforms and created mappings of the API call
frequencies.
Other studies detect the presence of malware command and
control channels. Signature-based detection systems that check
for known byte sequences in packet headers or payloads may
be less successful with new malware variants or encrypted
traffic. So, anomaly detection methods using data mining
methods [7] can distinguish benign from malware traffic.
For example, features such as correlations between malware
channel request and response times [8], short packet sizes [9],
TLS header information [10], or a combination of features [11]
are possible differentiators. The features facilitate malware
detection and prevention but the encrypted contents are hidden.
Controller emulation can discover malware client plaintext.
Logging client requests may provide useful insights although
cited challenges may be environment security, scalability for
large botnets, and transparency, where malware detects the
presence of a test environment and terminates [12]. Although
a controlled environment is advantageous [13] and can be
used to detect adversaral activities [14] emulator drawbacks
for decrypting real-world malware communications may be
not knowing valid controller responses but, perhaps more
importantly, the malware must be known a priori to execute
in the environment.
Patil et al [15] define an investigation framework for
analysing captured memory for the detection of malware using
information from processes, running threads, opened registry
keys, and user authentication details. Google, too, focus on
memory inspection for the detection of malware [16] and use
a number of virtual machines to detect anomalous behaviour.
Feichtner et al [17] defines a method of detecting crypto-
graphic misuse in Apple iOS applications. Their work uses a
decompilation method to analyse the code calls to the core
cryptographic libraries. In their analysis they found that 82%
of the applications sampled had a cryptographic flaw. For this
they defined six main rules to identify a cryptographic flaw.
These included: the usage of the ECB mode for encryption;
the usage of a non-random IV for CBC encryption; and the
usage of constant encryption keys. Most of flaws found related
to the usage of a non-random Initialization Vector (IV) and the
usage of constant encryption keys. They also found that 27%
of the sampled apps used ECB (Electronic Code Book) for the
symmetric key encryption.
A priori malware knowledge may also enable plaintext
discovery. While virtual machine environments, such as
DRAKVUF [18], support malware dynamic analysis, such
solutions succeed only where actual, or suspected, malware
is obtained. Our approach requires no prior knowledge so
discovering the plaintext in the encrypted communications of
unknown malware is possible.
Discovery of malware cryptographic artefacts may en-
able their communications to be decrypted. For example,
researchers have discovered TLS encryption keys in mem-
ory [19]. Initialization vectors were not discovered, which
for commonly-used AES-GCM encryption is necessary, so
plaintext was not derived. Furthermore, whereas keys were
discovered in Linux memory, malware is still predominantly
Windows-focused [10].
III. SOURCING MALWARE SAMPLES
Malware communications analysis ideally executes real
malware samples. Samples of recent provenance are preferable
as these may reflect the approaches of modern malware
authors, Maintained online databases provide guides to current
usage. For SSL traffic, the SSL Blacklist website [20] lists
bot and ransomware clients in reverse chronological order
of awareness. From the list, 35 potential malware entities
were identified. For each, multiple client executable samples
were downloaded in compressed, password protected from the
VirusShare website [21]. The compressed files are securely
copied to the client. on which Windows Defender is disabled,
the compressed files uncompressed and executed. As the
responder acting as a malware controller was not configured
to respond appropriately, only three executables successfully
established a TLS connection including a data exchange with
a server running the OpenSSL server application [22]. The
three malware executables are listed in Table I followed by
pertinent background.
TABLE I
MALWARE SAMPLES
Type Class MD5
Bot Zbot eeef1e062c8011cabb23b3c833ff766a
Ransomware Torrentlocker aeb5bb78ab442bc94bb94d968754e523
Bot Gozi 67a775879d3664456cb6a5026c518ca0
Zbot, also known as ZeuS or Zeus, is a well-known bot
malware instance. Detected in 2006 [23], Zbot is primarily
known for stealing banking passwords by injecting code into a
user browser as illustrated in Figure 1. Other Zbot functionality
includes extracting information such as browser history and
cookies, certificates, and mail account information as well
as perform actions such as manipulate local files, install
ransomware, log keystrokes, take screenshots, and manage
a botnet of other infected computers [24] [25]. Although
Zbot previously used the HTTP protocol for communications,
information and commands are now generally concealed with
TLS.
Gozi, also known as Ursnif inter alia, is also an information-
stealing bot. Detected in 2007 [27], Gozi is commonly used
by malicious actors for stealing and other confidential banking
information [28] [29] [30] as shown in 2. Although functions
include theft of cookies and email credential, and logging
of keystrokes and browsing activity [31], a key feature is
intercepting network traffic to hijack financial transactions. For
example, when a money transfer is detected, Gozi issues an
encrypted message through its command and control server
to prevent the correct transfer and redirect the funds to a
controlled account [32].
TorrentLocker is an instance of crypto-ransomware. Known
since 2014, sufficiently similar to CryptoLocker to also be
known as Crypt0L0cker, it encrypts user documents including
Fig. 1. Zbot Fake [26]
pictures, advises the user of its action, and demands payment
using Bitcoins [33] as indicated in Figure 3. Although client-
controller communications were previously encrypted using
XOR, TLS is now a common communications mechanism
[34]. Information transmitted to the controller includes the
ransom page, the encryption key which is RSA-encrypted with
a TorrentLocker public key, counts of encrypted files, address
book contacts, email credentials, and logs [33].
IV. APPROACH
The analysis framework executes in a virtualized environ-
ment, A hypervisor supports a virtual machine monitor exe-
cuting on a privileged virtual machine, a suspect client virtual
machine executing malware samples, and virtual machines
providing server functionality for client communications. The
framework extracts read/write client virtual machine memory,
analyses memory extracts to discover small sets of candidate
cryptographic artefacts, and decrypts encrypted network traffic
until a decrypt is validated. The framework accommodates
SSH and TLS protocols and encryption algorithms such as
AES and ChaCha20.
A standard TLS extension searches memory extracts for key
blocks that a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) create
after the handshake. For AES-GCM, the agreed encryption
algorithm for each malware sample, key blocks contain client
and server encryption keys, and client and server implicit
initialization vector (IV) segments. MemDecrypt memory
analysis searches for key blocks following the process illus-
trated in 4 where the explicit IV segment in an Application
Data network packet enables searches for candidate implicit
IVs, which enable candidate key block discovery. Candidate
implicit IVs are memory extract segments co-located with
explicit IV segment values. Candidate key blocks are mem-
ory extract segments co-located with candidate implicit IV
segments and where the key block client key and server key
exceed a threshold.
A. Test Environment
The Xen Project 4.4.1 hypervisor runs on a Core 2 Duo
Dell personal computer with 40 GB of disk storage and 3 GB
of RAM, It supports a privileged hypervisor console running
Debian release 3.16.0-4-amd64 version and the MemDecrypt
framework. and three unprivileged virtual machines. Exper-
iments execute on a Windows client and a Linux server
virtual machine. The client runs the Windows 10 (10.0.16299)
operating system with 2 GB of memory and 40 GB of disk,
and the server runs an Ubuntu 14.04 build (“Trusty”) with
512 MB of allocated memory and 4 GB of disk storage.
The environment is configured for malware containment.
The malware client is prevented from communicating with
external servers to prevent possible corruption of other
environments. So, an additional Linux machine running
Ubuntu 14.04 build (“Trusty”) with 512 MB of allocated
memory and 4 GB of disk storage is established as a DNS
server using the ‘dnsmasq’ package. Responses to benign
DNS requests, such as *.microsoft.com, return the DNS
server IP address and to other requests the IP address of the
target TLS server. For the first experiment, debug mode was
enabled to log keys, IVs and plaintext. The OpenSSL server
command used was:
openssl s_server -accept 443 -debug -cert crt.pem -key
key.pem -WWW
B. Results
With Zbot, the application of the standard TLS extension
to memory extraction and analysis, the decrypt analysis com-
ponent was projected to require approximately 34 hours to
identify correct artefacts. By excluding artefacts less than
1000 bytes apart in memory extracts, this reduced to 15
minutes so the combined analysis duration was 38 minutes.
Although quicker than brute-force, cryptanalytic, and side-
channel approaches, the duration may be insufficient for prac-
tical application in live scenarios. Furthermore, the duration is
substantially longer than earlier experiments with, for example,
the OpenSSL library, warranting further analysis.
Two factors cause this increase. One is the 8-byte explicit
IV segment obtained from an Application Data Message. For
Zbot, the first explicit IV segment is ’0x0000000000000001’
as illustrated in the highlighted section of the Wireshark packet
capture in Figure 5. This byte sequence occurs more frequently
than randomly generated explicit IVs in memory extracts. So,
when the explicit IV is used to discover possible four-byte
implicit IV segments, 578,629 possible instances were found.
Entropy measure thresholds reduced the candidate key block
size to 23,361. By contrast, an experiment with an OpenSSL
client application yielded three candidate implicit IVs and 79
candidate keys.
The other factor is masquerading. To evade detection,
malware applications may camouflage their activities and one
such mechanism is masquerading as a benign application
so the malware may also be known as a ‘trojan’. In the
Windows environment, examples of benign applications used
for masquerading includes the Edge browser and Windows
Explorer. However, when Zbot masquerades as the Windows
Explorer, for example, the data collection component extracts
Fig. 2. Gozi Data Theft [27]
Fig. 3. TorrentLocker/Crypt0L0cker Warning
265 read/write memory files totalling 73.2 MB for each sepa-
rate extraction. The combination of these two factors leads to
large sets of candidate keys and IVs.
V. WINDOWS LIBRARY EXTENSION
Memory extract features suggest a more efficient alternative.
Using the session key and IV from OpenSSL server logs,
a search of malware client application memory yielded in-
teresting facts: the key occurs frequently in different extract
files, memory extract files sizes containing the key are within
specific ranges, and two unusual ASCII strings are present
near encryption key locations in the memory extract files.
The repeated occurrence of the key in memory extracts may
result from data protection or an absence of data cleansing.
After a TLS handshake when client and server keys have been
generated by a pseudo-random generator, the keys may be
copied to record data structures for simplified access by the
encryption process. The malware may copy the keys repeatedly
to ensure access. Alternatively, the malware writer may copy
keys on different occasions but fail to cleanse the source or
copy. In any case, this feature is not used in the extension.
Sizes of memory extract files containing encryption keys
ranged between 2 MB and 4 MB. Consistent with prior SSH
and TLS investigations, the size probably originates from an
application memory allocation request (‘malloc’) for a data
structure to hold the encryption, or decryption fields such as
Fig. 4. GCM Memory Analysis Approach
Fig. 5. Gozi Handshake & Application Data message
keys, encrypt/decrypt flags, key length, mode, etc. As illus-
trated in Figure 6 which maps the number of segments above
a 4.5 threshold (Y-axis) against the extracted size (X-axis),
the distribution of high-entropy counts in malware application
memory suggests that prioritizing regions for analysis may
speed up the IV and key discovery process.
The presence of specific ASCII strings in memory extracts
containing keys is more significant. The strings are ‘3LLS’
and ‘KSSM’, or in big-endian format" ’SSL3’ and ‘MSSK’.
Researchers identified ‘MSSK’ in the Windows security pol-
icy application, Local Security Authority Subsystem Service
(LSASS) as a possible acronym for ‘Microsoft Symmetric
Key’ or ‘Microsoft Symmetric Key’ [35]. ‘SSL3’ may refer to
the deprecated forerunner of TLS, SSLv3. Kambic identified
probable fields in the undocumented LSASS data structure
including: encryption data structure sizes; TLS version; and
the encryption key. The field identified by Kambic as the
probable IV field is inconsistent with MemDecrypt memory
extracts. The implicit IV is located approximately 20 bytes
after the ‘3LLS’ string, and the key approximately 30 bytes
after the ‘KSSM’ string. Although random occurrences are
possible, the strings provide good indicators for identifying
candidate memory extracts containing cryptographic artefacts
when Microsoft security libraries are used.
A MemDecrypt extension to decrypt TLS communications
from executables that use Microsoft security libraries
accommodates these features. Microsoft encryption libraries
are assumed When TLS Application Data messages contain
explicit IV values of ‘x0000000000000001’, Additional
techniques such as the identification of executable linked
libraries might validate this assumption. Extract file sizes are
banded to prioritise medium-sized files. The extract files are
searched for the ASCII strings and fields in near locations in
the same extracts and of sufficient entropy to be candidate
keys and IVs are identified. The Microsoft memory analysis
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. The banding is wider,
and the maximum allowable distances in memory between
’3LLS’ and a candidate IV, and ’KSSM’ and a candidate
key exceed the empirically observed values to allow for
potential data structure changes, as may result from operating
system upgrades. The entropy thresholds for ’IVsize’ and
’keysize’ are set to 1.5 and 4.5 respectively based on previous
experiments with PRNG functions. If the Microsoft library
extension fails to find cryptographic artefacts, the TLS
extension provides a fall-back.
Fig. 6. Windows Explorer High-entropy Regions
Data: Extracts folder, entropy thresholds, keysize
Result: Z = candidate keys, Y = candidate IVs
for file in folder do
if 1 MB < size(file) < 8MB then
Band1 += file;
end
if 0 MB < size(file) < 1MB then
Band2 += file;
end
if 8 MB < size(file) then
Band3 += file;
end
end
IVsize = 4;
for each file in Bands 1-3 do
if ‘KSSM’ in extract then
start = location (‘3LLS’);
for i = start to MaxIVdistance inc by 4 do
s = extract[i:i+4];
if entropy(s) > threshold(IVsize) then
Y += s
end
end
Start = location ‘KSSM’;
for i = start to MaxKeydistance increment by 4
do
s = extract[i:i+keysize];
if entropy (s) > threshold(keysize) then
Z += s;
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Windows Library Memory Analysis
VI. WINDOWS LIBRARY EXTENSION EVALUATION
Experiments were executed to evaluate the Windows library
extension. Each malware sample was executed on a Windows
10 client, memory extracted and Ubuntu OpenSSL server
logs collected. Analysis decrypts were validated by evaluating
compliance with HTTP 1.1 and comparison with server logs.
An example of Zbot decrypted analysis output is illustrated in
Figure 7 and verification provided by the OpenSSL server log
shown in Figure 8. Each Zbot, Gozi, and TorrentLocker sam-
ples decrypted with 100% success. Decrypt output examples
for all malware samples are shown in Table II. Host names and
GET image names vary for different test runs, and furthermore,
Gozi decrypts produce POST as well as GET requests.
Analysis component durations for each malware sample
confirm the extension’s performance. As illustrated in Table
III the maximum combined duration for memory analysis and
decrypt analysis is below 1 second, a direct consequence of
reduced candidate cryptographic artefact set sizes. With the
Microsoft library extension, the set sizes range between three
and six, and IV set sizes between 79 and 483.
A. Analysis
The small experimental set size might inhibit complete
confidence in the extension’s capacity to decrypt encrypted
malware command and control traffic. When malware writers
have developed custom security routines, analysts have broken
them easily broken so known cryptographic libraries are more
commonly used. Microsoft library presents a good opportu-
nity for malware writers being pre-loaded with a Windows
operating system. Use of libraries such as OpenSSL would
require additional download increasing the risk of detection.
It is concluded that payloads of secure TLS communications
between malware clients executing on Windows clients and
their controllers can be rapidly discovered.
Fig. 7. Zbot Decrypt Log
Fig. 8. Zbot Server Log
Decrypting a single request is not conclusive. This out-
come is determined by testbed configuration as the server
responds with OK to any TLS requests, In the absence of a
reasonable response, the client may terminate or cease further
communications with the controller. Also, decryption may not
necessarily provide useable information, particularly where
the plaintext includes a secondary encryption layer as with
TorrentLocker. However, having discovered the key and IV, a
complete session is decryptable.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Rapid decryption of live TLS malware traffic offers exciting
prospects. For instance, by permitting the client to communi-
cate with its controller in a managed environment, knowledge
such as client-controller interaction details may contribute to
enhanced malware defences. Furthermore, decrypting unman-
aged communications between malware and controller may
provide ransomware keys or stolen banking details. Future
work will explore these opportunities as well as expanding
the range of tested malware clients.
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